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Introduction
Violence against other social, national, ethnic, racial and 
religious groups continues to affect many parts of the 
world. Such communal riots may produce significant 
human rights violations and loss of life, and may even be a 
harbinger of more severe political or intergroup conflict 
(Horowitz, 2001).
A number of scholars, including Brass (1997), Dancygier 
(2010), Olzak (1992) and Wilkinson (2004), have conse-
quently provided careful analyses of the determinants of 
communal violence. They do so from the “top down”, how-
ever, treating riots as events and offering ecological-level 
explanations. A newer group of researchers have comple-
mented this research with microlevel examinations of indi-
viduals’ motivations for participation in attacks on other 
groups (Claassen, 2014; Scacco, 2010).
Despite this accumulation of research on why riots occur 
and why people participate, we still have little idea who the 
rioters are, and how many they number. There are both the-
oretical and policy reasons why we should want to know 
the answers to these questions. Data on numbers might 
offer a challenge to policymakers who dismiss rioters as 
a tiny criminal minority (see Misago et al., 2010; Sears 
and McConahay, 1969), while knowledge of who 
riots—the socio-demographic factors that correlate with 
participation—would seem to be a prerequisite to under-
standing why riots occur.
This paper uses recent survey data from South Africa to 
tackle both these questions: the numbers who take part in 
communal violence and the socio-demographic factors that 
predict who does. I use a survey of a sample of residents of 
a South African township1 that was struck by communal 
violence between locals and African immigrants in 2008 
(see Misago et al., 2010). Three features of the survey ren-
der it useful for the task of describing riot participants. 
Firstly, the survey was conducted in Alexandra, the town-
ship where the 2008 violence began and where it reached its 
greatest intensity. Secondly, interviews were conducted with 
a representative sample of adult South African residents of 
the area, permitting externally valid inferences about who 
actually participated in 2008. Thirdly, the participation 
questions were asked using a method designed to ensure the 
privacy of respondents, and thus the validity of responses.
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My results are as follows. With respect to numbers, I 
find that 8.5% of adult South African residents of the area 
participated in some way in 2008. In contrast to existing 
descriptions of participants, my survey data show that a sig-
nificant number of women took part in the 2008 riots in 
Alexandra (30% of participants). Moreover, and again in 
contrast to existing accounts, participants were not particu-
larly young (median age: 34). Those who participated in 
2008 were more likely to support an opposition party and to 
have a high-school (versus higher) education, particularly 
among the male subsample. Participants, particularly 
among the female subsample, also attended more commu-
nity policing meetings, which were the sites where violence 
was initially organized (Misago et al., 2010).
Communal riots
Researchers have noted high levels of xenophobia in South 
Africa, both in the form of pronounced anti-immigrant atti-
tudes (Mattes et al., 1999) as well as widespread lynchings 
of immigrants (Harris, 2004). Such xenophobia is particu-
larly severe in the townships that ring South African cities, 
where many black South Africans live, and where many 
immigrants from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and further 
afield have made their homes. In May of 2008 a wave of 
anti-immigrant violence swept these townships, lasting for 
three weeks and leaving 62 dead, 670 wounded and 100,000 
displaced (see Misago et al., 2010; Steinberg, 2008).
These attacks can be viewed as examples of communal 
riots, as they are: (1) a form of collective violence lasting 
hours, days or weeks; (2) incidents where violence is perpe-
trated by ordinary people, that is, not regular or irregular mem-
bers of the armed forces; and (3) events in which the targets 
are some other social, national, ethnic, racial or religious 
group. As this definition suggests, communal riots are more or 
less synonymous with “deadly ethnic riots”, as described in 
Horowitz’s (2001) encyclopaedic book of the same name.
A number of major studies—Horowitz’s included—have 
investigated the causes of communal riots. Scholars have 
typically treated riots as events, explaining their occurrence 
as an extension of competition, either between groups 
(Dancygier, 2010; Olzak, 1992) or group leaders (Brass, 
1997; Wilkinson, 2004). The most rigorous study of the 2008 
anti-immigrants riots (Misago et al., 2010) echoes this latter 
thread in the literature, finding that the attacks were insti-
gated at township community policing meetings, often with 
the involvement of the leaders of these informal institutions.
Participation in communal violence: 
who and how many?
Although the bulk of the existing scholarly effort has been 
expended on explaining why communal riots occur, some 
scholars have also turned their attention to the participants 
who make up the mobs. Horowitz’s (2001) exhaustive 
review of secondary sources concludes that participants are 
working class and “overwhelmingly male” (258) with ages 
ranging “from the teens to the thirties, with the median 
toward the low end” (259). Tishkov’s (1995) analysis of a 
sample of individuals arrested after the 1990 Osh riots in 
Kyrgyzstan finds that all but one of the accused were male, 
a majority were from 25 to 30 years of age with few older 
than 40 and most had completed high school. Historical 
research on the European food riots of the 18th and 19th 
centuries, in contrast, notes the participation of women, 
older men and children (Gailus, 1994; Thompson, 1971).
These conclusions regarding participants in communal 
riots—contradictory as they are—are limited by the unrelia-
ble sources of data on which they rest: convenience samples 
and impressionistic accounts. Far preferable as a research 
method is a public opinion survey of a representative sample 
of residents of an affected area, which is the technique I 
deploy. Surprisingly, there are only two other such surveys, 
as far as I am aware. The first is by Scacco (2010), and is a 
probability survey of the riot-prone Nigerian cities of Jos and 
Kaduna, conducted in 2008. Although Scacco does not sam-
ple women, based on the assumption that women did not par-
ticipate, she finds that 19% of adult males took part in the 
2001 riots. She finds, moreover, that participants tended to 
be poorer and active in community policing organizations. 
The second is the Los Angeles Riot Study of the neighbour-
hoods affected by the 1965 Watts riots (Sears and McConahay, 
1969).2 The researchers find that that 22% of the residents of 
the affected areas took part, 68% of respondents who admit-
ted taking part were under 30, and 62% were male. Indicators 
of socio-economic status, however, show little or no relation-
ship with participation.
Thus, in sum, the sparse evidence we have regarding 
numbers of participants suggests that they are a minority, 
but their absolute number is large. We know even less with 
respect to the socio-demographic predictors of participa-
tion: some sources suggest that rioting is carried out by 
young men; others note the participation of women and 
older people. The data on participation and socio-economic 
status is similarly contradictory.
Data and methods
Data on participation in communal riots is best gathered 
using a public opinion survey of a probability sample of 
residents of an area recently affected by such a riot. In April 
and May 2011, I conducted such a survey of a representa-
tive sample of 497 adult South African residents of 
Alexandra, where the 2008 violence began and where it 
reached its greatest intensity (Misago et al., 2010).
Sampling
There is no reliable list of addresses in townships like 
Alexandra, nor are landlines telephones or internet 
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connections common. To arrive at a representative sample. 
I stratified by the major housing types of government flats, 
hostels and houses and shacks. Then, using satellite photo-
graphs, I divided each stratum into equal-sized clusters and 
randomly selected clusters from within each stratum. 
Within each cluster, each interviewer was assigned a direc-
tion in which to walk and used a randomly chosen sampling 
interval to select dwellings (houses, shacks, flats or hostel 
rooms) for further investigation. The same sampling inter-
val was used to select households from within each dwell-
ing. Finally, a specially constructed random number table 
was used to select a respondent from the adult South 
African members of the household. Face-to-face interviews 
were conducted in or near the respondents’ homes in 
Alexandra. One call-back was required for non-contact and 
no substitutions were permitted. The response rate (AAPOR 
#3) is 69.2%.3
Some 8% of the sample (N = 45) were not present in 
Alexandra at the time of the 2008 attacks. These respond-
ents were excluded from the analysis that follows, leaving 
a final sample size of 452.4
Measuring participation
The outcome of interest is individual participation in the 
attacks of 2008. Respondents may be reluctant to disclose 
such potentially incriminating information, but researchers 
such as Misago et al. (2010) and Steinberg (2008)—who 
have asked similar questions of Alexandra residents—have 
reported success, suggesting that social desirability biases 
may in fact be quite minimal.
Nevertheless, in an effort to reduce response bias as 
much as possible, I used a variation of the Gallup secret 
ballot technique—first adapted for riot participation by 
Scacco (2010)—when asking respondents about their par-
ticipation in the 2008 riots. Five questions were asked: 
whether the respondent had (1) joined in one of the protests 
that preceded some of the attacks, (2) threatened or intimi-
dated anyone, (3) looted, (4) harmed anyone, or (5) 
destroyed any shacks during the attacks of 2008. 
Respondents received a small card with five rows of the 
letters “A”, “B” and “C”, and were asked to circle the letter 
that corresponded to the correct answer for each question.5 
When all five questions had been completed, respondents 
were then asked to seal the card in an envelope that had 
been provided, ensuring that their responses remained hid-
den from the interviewer.
The survey was conducted three years after the riots. 
Although such an interval would render many, if not most 
kinds of memories vague and unreliable, Alexandra residents 
were very unlikely to have forgotten their participation (or 
non-participation) by the time of the survey. The attacks of 
2008 are branded in the public imagination in Alexandra.6 
Moreover, immediately before gathering the measures of 
participation, I asked respondents if they remembered the 
attacks. Although there may be some social desirability bias 
in answering in the affirmative, it is revealing that not one 
respondent claimed to have no knowledge of the attacks.7
Producing estimates from complex survey 
samples
Describing participants in communal riots requires making 
inferences from a sample to a population. Given that my 
sample is complex—featuring both stratification and 
clustering—this inference is somewhat complicated. I use 
various functions available in the survey library in R 
(Lumley, 2010), which (1) adjust estimates by the inverse 
of the probability of selection into the sample, (2) post-
stratify the estimates,8 (3) calculate variances taking strati-
fication, clustering and post-stratification into account, (4) 
estimate confidence intervals using a beta-binomial distri-
bution, which Korn and Graubard (1998) recommend for 
small proportions and (5) combine estimates from the five 
multiply-imputed datasets.
Results and discussion
I begin with the results regarding numbers of participants. 
Figure 1 displays my estimates of the proportion of the popu-
lation of Alexandra who took part in various ways in the 
2008 attacks. In particular, I find that 8.5% of adult South 
African residents of Alexandra report some form of partici-
pation in the riots of 2008, with 11.6% of men taking part and 
5.3% of women. Moreover, 3.6% of Alexandra residents 
took part in one of the more aggressive behaviours: destroy-
ing immigrants’ shacks or engaging in physical assault.
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Figure 1. Proportion participating in each riot behaviour.
N= 452. Points show the proportion of the sample who reported 
performing each behaviour during the 2008 riots. Question wording in 
online supplementary materials. Vertical lines are the 90% confidence 
intervals. Numbers at the foot of the plot are the sample size within the 
particular category.
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Figure 2. Participation in communal violence, by socio-demographic variables.
N = 452. Points shown are the proportion of the sample who reported participating within categories of corresponding socio-demographic variable. 
Vertical lines are the 90% confidence intervals indicating sampling error. Numbers at the foot of each plot are the sample size within the particular 
category. Significance effects (based on a bivariate logit regression): Gender: male > female (p = .003).
Education: high school > higher education (p = .07).
Language: Tswana < Xhosa (p = .05); Tswana < Zulu (p = .08); Tswana  < Pedi (p = .07); Tswana  < Other (p = .02).
Housing type: hostel > flat (p < .01); hostel > house (p < .01); hostel > back room (p > .01); hostel > shack (p = .01).
Age: quadratic term < 0 (p = .02).
Party support: African National Congress (ANC) < opposition party (p < .01).
Meeting attendance: linear effect > 0 (p = .02).
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Next, I turn to bivariate comparisons of participants 
with non-participants across 11 demographic, social and 
political factors. Note that while participation is measured 
as a recollection of behaviours conducted in 2008, the 
other covariates were measured at their 2011 levels. 
Although this makes little difference for exogenous factors 
such as gender, home language and age, factors such as 
party support and meeting attendance are potentially 
endogenous to earlier riot participation. Causal interpreta-
tions of the effects of these latter variables may not be 
warranted.
Figure 2 displays the bivariate cross-tabulations. Each 
plot corresponds with the cross-tabulation of participation 
and one of the 11 socio-demographic variables. This explor-
atory analysis reveals that levels of participation in the 2008 
anti-immigrant riot in Alexandra vary considerably by 
socio-demographic subgroup. Among some subgroups 
(such as those who live in hostels, support an opposition 
party or attended two or three community meetings in the 
last year), more than 15% participated. In other subgroups 
(such as being Tswana-speaking, living in a government flat 
or being older than 50), few individuals took part.
I then include all the covariates in three logit models of 
participation, the first using the whole sample, and the sec-
ond and third utilizing just the male and female subsam-
ples.9 The results are presented in Table 1.
Party support and age emerge as significant correlates of 
participation, with gender, meeting attendance and having a 
high-school—compared to higher—education significant 
at the 90% level. The use of logit coefficients, dummy vari-
able contrasts and quadratic terms (for age) suggest that a 
graphical display of predicted probabilities would be useful 
for interpreting the results of these regressions (see Gelman 
and Pardoe, 2007). Thus, in Figure 3, I plot the predicted 
effects of all variables that show a significant effect (at the 
90% confidence level) in Table 1. These five plots show the 
predicted probabilities of having taken part (y-axis) when 
varying each of the five significant covariates (x-axis), 
while holding all other variables at their means.
Returning to the regression results, one of the strongest 
findings that emerges from this analysis is the relationship 
between opposition party support and having participated 
in the 2008 riots. This association is even stronger in the 
male subsample. The first plot in Figure 3 shows the effect 
clearly: Alexandra residents who support the ANC, with all 
other variables held constant, are estimated to have about a 
7% probability of having taken part. This predicted proba-
bility rises threefold to over 22% for residents who support 
an opposition party.
A second finding of note is the effect of age. The quad-
ratic term is negative and significant—both in the whole 
sample and the male subsample—indicating a concave 
Table 1. Logistic regression analysis of participation in 2008.
Whole sample Men Women
Party support: nonea .65 (.49) .67 (.57) 1.01 (.68)
Party support: opposition 1.30*** (.49) 1.85*** (.57) 1.24* (.67)
Socio-economic status −1.28 (1.25) −2.18 (1.73) −.60 (1.46)
Employment: unemployedb .27 (.28) −.13 (.56) 1.20** (.60)
Employment: not in the labour force 1.34 (1.06) 2.62* (1.45) −.08 (1.48)
Age (in decades) 2.83** (1.20) 6.39*** (1.97) −1.07 (1.45)
Age (in decades) squared −.38** (.16) −.83*** (.28) .08 (.19)
Proportion of life spent in Alexandra 1.20 (.78) 1.67 (1.12) .43 (1.37)
Housing: hostelc 1.11 (.80) .32 (1.04) 2.89** (1.23)
Housing: shack .81 (.54) .79* (.46) 1.05 (1.05)
Housing: backyard room .91 (.63) 1.27** (.63) −.22 (1.18)
Single .04 (.33) .53 (.37) −.97 (.80)
Male .74* (.39)  
Meeting attendance .31* (.17) .34 (.24) .56** (.25)
Education: primary schoold .55 (1.03) 1.02 (1.26) 1.18 (1.92)
Education: some high school .39 (.71) .87 (.99) −.24 (1.52)
Education: completed high school 1.08* (.62) 1.74** (.77) −.14 (1.56)
Language: Zulu −.02 (.38) .23 (.51) −.49 (.50)
N 452 222 230  
***p < .01, **P < .05, *P < .10.
aOmitted category is African National Congress (ANC) support.
bOmitted category is employed.
cOmitted category is formal house or flat.
dOmitted category is higher education.
Estimates are post-stratified by home language, employment status and age. Design-based standard errors in parentheses.
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slope. Figure 3 then provides a much clearer picture of how 
age is related to the probability of participation. This plot, 
the fifth in Figure 3, shows this concave quadratic effect of 
age on probability of participation. The respondents most 
likely to have participated are those who were around 34 
years old in 2008. This is quite different to the angry young 
men who are typically regarded as the protagonists of both 
protest and communal riots (Horowitz, 2001). Indeed, the 
model estimates that respondents who were 20 years old in 
2008 had only half the likelihood of taking part in the 
attacks of respondents who were 34—5% versus 10%.
Thirdly, I find that the probability of participation in the 
2008 riots is associated with attendance at community 
policing meetings. This correlation between participation 
and meeting attendance is strongest in the female subsam-
ple. Although the meeting attendance survey item asked 
respondents to report their attendance in 2011, existing 
research suggests that participants in the 2008 riots were 
probably drawn from attendees at policing meetings. As 
Misago et al. (2010) describe, these meetings were the 
organizing venues for the attacks on foreigners.10
The results are also interesting for socio-demographics 
that are not significant covariates. In contrast to Scacco 
(2010), I find that participation is not a function of poverty, 
with socio-economic status showing only a weak and insig-
nificant relationship. In addition, in contrast to previous 
qualitative research on the anti-immigrant violence of 2008 
(Misago et al., 2010; Nieftagodien, 2012), I find that nei-
ther being a long-term resident of the area nor being Zulu-
speaking is an important correlate of having participated.
Conclusion
This paper presents estimates for two unanswered ques-
tions regarding communal riots: firstly, the question of how 
many people participate in such violence; secondly, the 
question of who takes part. The evidence is obtained from a 
survey of a probability sample of residents from an urban 
slum in South Africa where anti-immigrant violence 
occurred in 2008. The advantages of this dataset for the 
questions at hand are its representative sample and the 
measurement of participation using the privacy-enhancing 
Gallup secret ballot technique.
There are six main findings. Firstly, like Scacco (2010), 
I find that around 9% of local residents of the affected area 
took part in the violence of 2008. Secondly and thirdly, in 
contrast to the conclusions of existing research (Horowitz, 
2001; Scacco, 2010; Tishkov, 1995) regarding the age and 
gender of participants, I find that although male partici-
pants predominate, a significant number of women 
also join in attacks on another group. Neither were the par-
ticipants especially young, having a median age of 34. 
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Finally, participants are more likely to attend community 
policing meetings, be opposition party supporters and have 
a high-school (rather than tertiary) education.
Despite its novelty, this dataset has a number of limita-
tions. Firstly, there is a three-year gap between the riots in 
question and the survey fieldwork. Emigrants are also not 
sampled. Most importantly, the covariates of participation 
are measured contemporaneously to the survey, while par-
ticipation is measured retrospectively, limiting the causal 
interpretations of many of the findings presented here. Our 
understanding of participants, and thus our understanding 
of communal riots, would benefit from a future study that is 
designed to overcome such limitations.
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Notes
 1. In South Africa, “township” typically refers to a residential 
area that was reserved for non-whites under South Africa’s 
apartheid policy. Although townships may contain shacks 
or even entire informal settlements, many also have areas of 
formal houses that resemble suburbs in all respects.
 2. Strictly speaking, a protest riot rather than a communal riot 
(McPhail, 1994).
 3. Further details on sampling, implementation, question word-
ing and missing data are available in the online supplemen-
tary materials.
 4. While I exclude those who immigrated to Alexandra after 
2008, I do not collect data on Alexandra residents who emi-
grated after 2008. A comparison of the marginals of the 2005 
Alexandra Benchmark Survey and my sample shows, how-
ever, that the ethnic and age distributions of the population 
did not appear to change between 2005 and 2011 (results 
in online supplementary materials). My 2011 sample found 
more unemployed people, but this is likely due to sampling 
error, as I explain in the online materials, rather than emigra-
tion after 2008.
 5. The response set was as follows: “If you did this and feel 
that it was the right thing to do, make a cross on the ‘A’ next 
to the number ‘1’ (2, etc.). If you did this and regret it now, 
make a cross on the ‘B’ next to the number ‘1’. If you did 
not do this, make a cross on the ‘C’ next to the number ‘1’”. 
Responses were recoded as dichotomous; having performed 
the behaviour in question received a value of 1, otherwise 0.
 6. Indeed, the English word “xenophobia” has come to denote 
the attacks themselves—as in the “the xenophobia of 
2008”—rather than the official meaning of the word as an 
abstract antipathy to persons and things foreign.
 7. In addition, Scacco (2010) finds many Nigerians who took 
part in the riots of 2008, despite conducting her fieldwork 
seven years later.
 8. Sampling weights are the product of the inverse of the square 
root of household size and the inverse of the sampling inter-
val for each housing type/stratum. The sample is then post-
stratified by age, employment status and first language, using 
the method of raking. Population data is obtained from the 
2005 Alexandra Benchmark Survey.
 9. The outcome variable is coded as 1 if the respondent took 
part in any way, 0 otherwise. The results are substantially the 
same when participation is treated as an ordered factor. See 
the online supplementary materials.
10. Striking video footage of one of these meetings, taken during 
the riots, is shown in the short documentary, Affectionately 
Known as Alex.
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